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ABSTRACT
Our world presents us with dangers and opportunities. Some of these dangers
and opportunities are easier to handle if two or more individuals learn to cooperate.
This thesis contributes five papers about cooperation, learning and catastrophic risk.
In papers I-II, we consider the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, a model for
where cooperation between two players is particularly hard to achieve. We introduce
and model strategies that attempt to convince others to cooperate when backward
induction can be used to eliminate cooperation for a number of steps from the
end. We find that in a population with these strategies, cooperation can become
recurrent, and we examine the conditions for this. Recurrent cooperation is possible
in an evolutionary model (paper I) as well as in a population of players that are
near-perfect Bayesian expected utility-maximizers (paper II).
In paper III, we consider a bargaining model of climate negotiations where players
negotiate emissions and sudden catastrophic damage occurs if emissions exceed a
threshold amount. We introduce and model a mechanism of strategic reasoning,
where players predict the emission bids of others, and consider how this affects the
possibility of reaching agreements preventing catastrophic damage. We find that the
effect of higher levels of strategic reasoning makes it harder to reach agreements in
the model. This effect can be partially mitigated by restricting the range of initial
bids in the bargaining process.
In paper IV, we consider the arguments by Hanson and Bostrom about the Great
Filter as an attempt to explain the Fermi Paradox. According to these arguments,
finding extraterrestrial life on one planet should lower our expectations for human-
ity’s prospects to progress far beyond our current technological capabilities. We
model this claim as a Bayesian learning problem and examine the effect a single
observation of life has in the model. We find that the conclusion of the argument
depends critically on the choice of prior distribution.
In paper V, we consider a model of agricultural markets and land-use competition
between food and bioenergy crops. Agents in the model represent farmers who decide
which crop to grow depending on predictors that give future price expectations. We
model agents who can switch among predictors to make their decisions. We find
that some predictor types can be concentrated on key parcels of land, which reduces
volatility in crop prices for the system. We also examine several mechanisms that
can bring price fluctuations in the system down and closer to a stable state.
Keywords: Cooperation, Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Backward Induction,
Climate negotiations, Catastrophic risk, Fermi Paradox, Bayesian analysis, Learning
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Our world presents us with dangers and opportunities. Some of these dangers and
opportunities are easier to handle when two or more individuals cooperate. One
example is climate change: Current climate change is already dangerous, and the
danger is increasing [62], but climate negotiations also present opportunities to es-
tablish cooperation and mitigate damage (paper III). Collective action problems
where cooperation is particularly hard to achieve can be explored using models such
as the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, which can be used to reason about
how cooperation can be established between two individuals (papers I and II). What
individuals believe and learn from observations about whether cooperation will be
reciprocated can be crucial for cooperation.
Further, models of learning can also shed light on how to interpret the Great
Filter arguments – a response to the Fermi Paradox – about why, so far, we have yet
seen no signs of extraterrestrial life. According to these arguments, finding extrater-
restrial life on one planet should lower our expectations for humanity’s prospects to
progress far beyond our current technological capabilities [19, 42]. Bayesian learning
makes it possible to analyze whether the conclusion of these arguments hold under
different assumptions (paper IV). Learning can also affect the volatility of prices in
environments such as commodity markets (paper V).
The aim of this thesis is to improve our knowledge of these and several related
questions. The contribution is five papers with five mathematical models. The
concepts of cooperation, learning and catastrophic risk connect the five papers. In
this introduction, we clarify these three concepts and the relevant methods and
research questions.
1.1 Three conceptual pillars
The work in this thesis is supported by three conceptual pillars: cooperation, learning
and catastrophic risk, present in each of the papers as follows.
1
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Cooperation Learning Catastrophic risk
Paper I X
Paper II X X
Paper III X X X
Paper IV X X
Paper V X
In the following sections, we take a look at these concepts in more detail.
1.1.1 Cooperation
Some goals that are hard for a single individual to achieve become easier to achieve
when several individuals cooperate.
Reaching a goal can sometimes be impossible without cooperation. For example,
a table might be too heavy for a single person to move at all, but two people
cooperating might be able to do it.1 Here, a contribution from more than one
individual is needed for successful cooperation to come about. Moving up to the
level where individual nation-states can cooperate with others, some problems can
also require all nation-states to cooperate before a goal can be reached, eradicating
global pandemics, such as the smallpox virus,2 for example.
Smallpox was declared to be eradicated in 1979 after successful international
cooperation across the borders during the Cold War. To avoid the pandemic prop-
agating again, starting from a few infected individuals isolated somewhere, it was
necessary for each and every country to cooperate to detect and prevent the virus to
spread. Had a single country defected from cooperation which required carefully co-
ordinated vaccination efforts [10], the virus could have survived within an individual
country, and it could soon have propagated outwards again through our vast social
networks. This shows that sometimes all individual nation-states must cooperate
for the efforts of others not to be in vain.
In other cases, the greater the number of individuals who cooperate, the more
progress is gradually made toward the relevant goal. Climate change mitigation
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a good example. Here, the more countries
(“individuals”) get involved, the closer we get to a goal of stabilizing greenhouse gas
concentrations. In this kind of case, all the benefits from the contributions of others
are not necessarily eliminated if an individual country defects.3
1Example due to Tuomela [72].
2Smallpox has led to hundreds of millions of casualities through history, so getting this eradicated
has been called “the greatest achievement of international cooperation ever” [9] by Barrett, a leading
researcher on international cooperation.
3Technically speaking, a single individual (or a single nation) could possibly realize significant
climate change mitigation by repeated large-scale injection of sulphur into the stratosphere, which
would cool off the atmosphere [13]. A billionaire would be an individual with this power. There
is even a term for this: A scenario in which a “greenfinger” takes action. However, this type of
intervention poses what might be an unacceptable risk to future generations, because the injection
must repeatedly continue to avoid climate damage.
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In this thesis, we consider both these forms of cooperation. In the model in
papers I and II, both individuals in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma have
to contribute for any benefits for a cooperating player to come about. In the model
in paper III, not necessarily all individuals have to contribute to reducing greenhouse
gas emissions in order to meet the goal of avoiding catastrophe.
We see that the concept of cooperation becomes relevant in many different cases,
from everyday situations to global challenges, and the types of individuals that can
participate in cooperation among humans can range between individual agents of
different forms such as persons, organizations, and the international level of coun-
tries. Common is that for cooperation we need contributions from more than one
individual. But to what degree is cooperation needed?
Homo sapiens is believed to have flourished on Earth because of the ability to
cooperate in large numbers [23]. An early example of large-scale cooperation is
human language: It has been argued that sudden improvements in human cognitive
capabilities around 70,000 years ago enabled us to share information flexibly and
develop shared culture in large groups [43, 59]. Sharing information about the world
can be viewed as a form of cooperation, but so can the use of language itself. It
has been argued that developing well-established languages also seems to require
some form of cooperation and it is unclear which came first [60]. It is reasonable to
believe that throughout history, many forms of cooperation have formed a basis for
building friendships, families, tribes, villages, cities, organizations and civilizations.
In our age, we continue to find new forms of cooperation such as when modern
technology enables new forms of large-scale cooperation over vast geographical and
cultural distances, as with the Wikipedia.
While it may appear that cooperation can solve many of our problems, it would
be naive to expect cooperation necessarily to come about to solve all of them. Our
future dangers and opportunities also relate to sustainable development [24] to ap-
propriately control our global natural, social and technological environment for fu-
ture generations of life. In these and other cases, cooperation can play an important
role; if the involved agents were to cooperate, we could all be better off. Evidence
suggests that complicated international problems can be solved; for example, coun-
tries agreed to protect the ozone layer.4 However, we know that there are serious
barriers to cooperation. Negotiations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions face such
barriers. These negotiations only represent one of many global challenges, but cli-
mate negotiations may be among the hardest problems to agree on how to solve,
because of the many factors involved [10].
We are thus clearly a cooperative species, but cooperation does not always come
about. On the one hand, it could be argued that evolution by selection has pro-
duced competitive mechanisms that benefit non-cooperating persons at the expense
of others who do cooperate. If individuals have the potential for free-riding, there
4An effort among countries which culminated in the adoption of the Montreal Protocol in 1987,
which Kofi Annan has called “Perhaps the single most successful international environmental agree-
ment to date” (2000) [10].
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could in principle be natural, built-in obstacles in any group. On the other hand,
we show many signs of altruism and of being predisposed to help others and norms
can have a crucial role [23]. This mix of self-interest and altruism is clear; equally
clear is the ease with which even trivial circumstances, such as finding a penny in
a phone booth, can sometimes influence our willingness to care for others [46]. Our
capacity for free-riding means we may need institutions with more or less systematic
mechanisms that provide more robust prerequisites for cooperation, such as with the
institution of taxation [10].
Thus, while cooperation can be desireable from a collective viewpoint, it need not
be for the individual. In any population, an individual can cooperate with or defect
from the actions which would make everyone in a group better off. This presents
us with the free-riding problem, in which an individual gains by not contributing to
the effort of the group as whole, i.e., from “defecting”.
A number of basic and more advanced cognitive factors have been suggested
to facilitate cooperation in humans because they allow detection and avoidance of
defectors [28]. These factors include recognizing others, remembering histories with
different individuals, the ability to communicate values to others, the ability to
understand the values of others and a general cognitive ability to represent costs
and benefits in interactions [26]. The factors can have many social aspects as well:
Cooperation can be facilitated by the perception of shared fate and of “being in the
same boat” [25, 70]. Mechanisms of so-called indirect reciprocity based on reputation
and gossip can also shape the willingness of others to engage in non-selfish behaviour
[61]. Taken together, this shows a few examples of that our beliefs and learning can
have a crucial role for cooperation.
Simulations based on theoretical modeling such as Axelrod’s famous computer
tournament with different strategies to play the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma have
also led to suggestions for facilitating cooperation [8]. Axelrod’s recommentaions
include: Emphasizing the repeated nature of interactions so that individuals under-
stand that defecting has consequences for future interactions; to teach reciprocity to
make it harder for exploitative free-riders to benefit; enable reputation mechanisms,
so that expectation works to shape the willingness of others to engage in cooperation.
Understanding the factors that explain cooperation also requires considering indi-
viduals other than persons, such as nation-states, for which self-interest can be an
important driver. It has been convincingly argued that self-interest is an important
factor in the international system of nation-states [55, 10].
Using Elster’s definition, “collective action” refers to the course of action by
all or most individuals that, when chosen by all or most individuals, leads to the
collective best outcome [31]. Collective action is often what is meant by cooperative
behaviour. Situations in which there is a conflict between individual and collective
interests have been described as “collective action problems”. Papers I, II and III
contain models of collective action problems, used to study under what assumptions
cooperation results. Elster [31] makes a useful distinction between “strong” and
“weak” collective action problems as follows.
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A strong collective action problem is a situation in which (1) each individual de-
rives greater benefits under conditions of universal cooperation than under universal
noncooperation, and (2) each individual derives greater benefits when abstaining
from cooperation, regardless of what others do.
A weak collective action problem is a situation in which (1) is the same as the
strong case above, but in which (2) cooperation is individually unstable and individ-
ually inaccessible. Individually unstable means that each individual has an incentive
to defect from a situation with full cooperation. Individually inaccessible means that
an individual has no incentive to take the first step away from a situation of universal
noncooperation.
In papers I and II we base the model on two players who are in the strong
collective action problem known as the Prisoners’ Dilemma (it also counts as a weak
collective action problem). The Prisoners’ Dilemma is a game-theoretic problem
which has been used to reason about hard cooperation problems such as avoiding
conflicts and arms races between individuals who can either try to conquer or suffer
from not doing so, but the model itself is phrased in general terms about two players,
where each chooses between cooperation and defection [8]. For each player, the
outcome is better if both choose to cooperate, compared to if both defect. However,
given full cooperation, the individual agent can gain an even better outcome by
abstaining from cooperation and choosing to defect, so no matter what the other
player does, it is always better to defect. Thus, we should expect rational players to
choose to defect if they only interact once in the single round version of the game.
Papers I and II build on the version of this game in which it gets repeated so that
players’ responses can have an effect over time.
In paper III we consider a weak collective action problem in a model of climate
negotiations where there is an emissions threshold for catastrophe. In the model,
negotiators bargain over emissions reductions but also attempt to avoid catastrophic
damage. With typical parameters, full defection (full emissions) corresponds to a
situation in which no single negotiating party can avoid catastrophic damage on
their own. However, if each country cooperates fully (maximal reduction), individ-
ual countries would gain from reducing their efforts. Moreover, if other countries
contribute a sufficiently large part in avoiding a catastrophe, a single country also
gets incentives to contribute and avoid the damage. This makes cooperation indi-
vidually unstable and individually inaccessible, but it does not satisfy the second
requirement for a strong collective action problem; thus, this is a weak collective
action problem.
Up to this point in the discussion cooperation is clearly something good for the
participants even if it may be hard to bring about. We saw above that a number of
circumstances have been found that facilitate higher levels of cooperation among in-
dividuals and it could be tempting to claim that we should always seek to make these
come about. Maybe there are other forms of cooperation that are less desireable?
Cooperation certainly has positive connotations: helping others, acting unselfishly,
and overcoming collective action problems, but this is from the perspective of the
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participants. Perhaps successful cooperation can bring not only opportunities, but
also dangers?
Such examples can be found in many social issues. For example, we might not
want particular forms of cooperation to come about in a market that supplies goods,
services or technologies efficiently. Companies could see gains from cooperating to
form price-setting cartels. It may be desireable for the individual companies to co-
operate and keep prices high, compared to engaging in a price competition that
lowers the price for customers. This might even have the structure of a Prisoners’
Dilemma, where the challenge is for two companies to establish cooperation instead
of lowering market prices. Defection (lowering the prices) may quickly attract many
of the customers and give one company a greater short-term benefit from more
customers, but both companies would fare less well than if cooperating. However,
outside observers may want to prevent the companies from finding a solution to this,
somewhat stylized, collective action problem of establishing a price cartel. Coop-
eration between criminals [30] is a phenomenon where we could have clear moral
reasons to understand and prevent. These examples remind us that cooperation is
a general phenomenon that is neither intrinsically good nor intrinsically bad.
Against this background, do we need to define cooperation? An approach of “we
know it when we see it” can be unsatisfactory from a scientific viewpoint. Given that
cooperation and the problem of collective action have been discussed for a long time
in biology as well as in social science, it is perhaps surprising that the literature exists
contains little discussion of the generic concept of cooperation. The first systematic
philosophical treatment about the cooperation concept seems to have been written
by Tuomela in 2000 [72].
Is there a single definition that can easily capture all forms of cooperation?
Tuomela argues that there is not, but suggests two distinct forms: group mode and
individual mode cooperation. The first form involves situations where individuals
have collective goals (such as two persons both having the same shared collective
goal of moving a heavy table). The second form involves situations where there are
conflicting interests that can introduce elements of free-riding. Here we have collec-
tive action problems such as climate change mitigation and the Prisoners’ Dilemma.
In these situations, full cooperation can present a temptation for an individual to
defect and let others do the work. Tuomela defines such cooperation in the indi-
vidual mode to exist between two agents A and B “if and only if A and B without
conflict fit their relevant private goals, preferences, and actions to the other’s private
goals, preferences, interests and actions (but do not have a collective goal related to
the actions in question)”. The point of Tuomela’s individual mode definition is to
describe cooperation that primarily arises out of the individual interests.5 Tuomela
argues that this form of cooperation is the one addressed in non-cooperative game
theory discussed below. In this thesis, we do not consider group preferences. All
our work falls back on modeling cooperation as ultimately depending on factors and
5An individual’s private interests are not to be confused with being selfish. A private interest
may as well describe a preference for an individual agent which is altruistic.
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properties of the invididuals involved, i.e., by methodological individualism [31].
Taken together, studying cooperation can include theoretical, empirical and eth-
ical questions. The theoretical efforts involve building models as described above
and can be done using game theory (more in Section 1.2). The empirical efforts
involve studying the conditions under which cooperation between individuals actu-
ally comes about; the individuals can represent different elements such as persons,
organizations and nation-states. Ethical questions are relevant if we seek to deter-
mine whether cooperation is desireable or not. This thesis makes an exclusively
theoretical contribution. Using quantitative models, we examine some theoretical
conditions with assumptions and mechanisms that make cooperation in the models
to come about.
1.1.2 Learning
A vast range of our actions are driven not by certain knowledge but mere beliefs.
With learning, an individual updates the beliefs it has about the world. Learning
can play an essential part of changing a course of action. While we are still learning,
we may have to act on the basis of partial or incomplete knowledge. An example:
Climate sensitivity is a parameter of core interest in estimating how large tempera-
ture to expect from a doubling of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere. Climate
sensitivity is likely in the range 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Celsius and this range of uncer-
tainty has held for decades [50, 47]. However, with the precise value unknown, the
range of this uncertainty can still warrant action as a large part of this interval could
have costly damage and effects on current and future persons.
To distinguish learning from action, it will be useful to think that a rational
agent can start out by believing something that is wrong or incomplete but still act
rationally given that uncertainty. But how can we more precisely distinguish being
rational from holding and learning different forms of belief? To distinguish among
different forms of belief, Elster [32] presents four different cognitive attitudes that
an individual can have towards the surrounding world: certainty, risk, uncertainty6
and ignorance.
The attitude of certainty is a particular form of belief that excludes doubts, and
beliefs can not be revised. The attitude of risk is a form of belief in which probabil-
ities can be attached to the different possible states of the world, and learning can
revise these beliefs. For the attitudes of uncertainty and ignorance, no probabilities
come into play. For this thesis, the relevant distinction is between Elster’s first two
attitudes.
Papers I and II are motivated by the question of whether players should have cer-
tainty in their beliefs about backward induction in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’
Dilemma. A backward induction assumption (see Section 1.2.4) means cooperation
6It should not be confused with decision-theoretic uncertainty in statistics and economics which
can carry meaning of a decision-makes subjective probabilities. Uncertainty in Elster’s framework
relates to a situation where a decision-maker is unable to form probabilities over the different
possible future states of the world.
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can not be established in the repeated game, predicting defection throughout the
game. However, the Backward Induction Problem [18] and the “Backward Induction
Paradox” [64] question the assumption that players hold backward induction beliefs
with certainty. The central question of this argument is to ask what players’ beliefs
about backward induction should be if cooperation gets played in the first round of
the repeated game, if they already have certainty in belief about continued defection.
The aim of papers I and II is to model different possible reactions when their beliefs
are not certain. In paper II, we present an explicit learning model where the extent
of backward induction used is observed by players with an belief attitude of risk,
where the players gradually learn and revise their beliefs about how much backward
induction takes place and what the possible reactions are.
The attitude of risk which allows for revision of beliefs using learning is present
in several forms in papers II, III, IV and V. In these papers, learning as a function
of the actions of others is used to anticipate future actions of other agents and what
effects these have. Learning also becomes relevant in paper IV in analyzing the Great
Filter arguments by Hanson and Bostrom, which is based on a statistical claim what
we could learn from observing extraterrestial life.
The distinction between rational choice, rational learning and learning in general
is important. Learning in general is simply updating beliefs based on observations.
Modern theories of rationality typically do not imply any specific beliefs; instead,
they allow agents to make prediction errors and act on these because expected utility
maximization is a function of beliefs as probabilities. An important special case of
learning results from the theory of Bayesian rationality: While it does not dictate
which prior beliefs a rational agent should hold, it implies that rational agents should
revise their beliefs by Bayes’ rule [17]. This is just one out of many possible and
suggested learning rules to update beliefs [33], but there are particular justifications
for this learning rule, discussed more below, and we use this in papers II and IV.
We cover some learning rules in Section 1.4.2 and note that some of them have been
argued to be rational.
Rationality and Learning
Rationality commonly has a precise meaning in game theory as expected utility
maximization, and this is used to reason about the players’ strategies based on
their beliefs and preferences [17, 36, 37]. It makes sense to clarify these theories of
rationality a bit for two reasons. First, in order to judge whether the requirement of
expected utility maximization is a reasonable to hold for rationality, we should know
the underlying assumptions. Second, if we use models of bounded rationality that
depart from expected utility maximization, we are, mathematically speaking, on less
firm ground. This is not necessarily a problem, but it can be good to understand
the distinction between rationality and other forms of decision-making.
Modern theories of rationality are rooted in the history and philosophy of games
and statistics. The explicit concept of utility was introduced by Bernoulli in the
18th century to resolve the so-called St. Petersburg Paradox [14]. Offering people
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the chance to participate in monetary lotteries that had infinite expected outcomes,
Bernoulli observed that people were not willing to pay very large sums of money
to take part. Bernoulli suggested an explanation for this: People do not primarily
care about the monetary value, but the utility of money. It would be reasonable
for a utility function to show diminishing marginal utility meaning that the first
unit of currency would be more worth than the second, which would be worth much
more than the millionth unit, and so on. This could make the expected utility of
Bernoulli’s lottery less than infinite and could form part of the explanation.
Modern theories of rational choice are value-neutral in the sense of not making
judgments about what are good or useful outcomes for real people. The primary the-
oretical concept is the preference relation which ranks the different possible options.
Rationality is often taken to be described by certain models of individual choice
from decision-theory and economics [17, 37]. These show that if a decision-maker
has preferences satisfying particular conditions, then the preferences are ranked by
expected utility. More precisely, these conditions are axioms about the forms of pref-
erence ordering that a decision-maker can hold. The utility concept is then relevant
because it comes into play with quantitative maximization of utility corresponding
to satisfying such preference orderings. If we hold these axioms to represent ratio-
nality, then maximization of expected utility is also rational. Two theories of choice
as expected utility maximization are discussed more in Section 1.2.2.
1.1.3 Catastrophic risk
A risk is a possible outcome which is valued negatively, so that there is some form
of danger.7 It makes sense to speak about risk for everything ranging from a person
playing roulette to possible effects of some event for human well-being on a global
scale. Both cooperation and learning are relevant to negotiating and refining our
beliefs about catastrophic risk.
Catastrophic and existential risk
One way to rank risks is by the number of affected individuals and the severity of
the outcomes [22]. At some point, when we gradually increase the severity of the
consequences so that they have a lasting significant effect for individuals, it becomes
relevant to speak of catastrophic risk. If we start from the level of catastrophic risk
and increase the number of affected individuals, at some point it will make sense
to speak of global catastrophic risks affecting many individuals severely on a global
scale. This group of risks includes severe damage from climate change, pandemics,
nuclear war, and secondary events arising from these, such as conflict and serious
threats to the social order [22].
If we continue even further, increasing the number of individuals affected, we
reach the entire global population. Adding a temporal element to this, some ex-
7The term risk is used in many contexts and more technical definitions exists. It should not be
confused with the definition of risk in decision-theory or the risky attitude to belief described by
Elster above.
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treme risks could be severe enough to affect not only the full global population,
but all future generations. In Bostrom’s terminology, an existential risk “is one
that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the
permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future development”
[20]. Thus, existential risks make up a particularly severe part of global catastrophic
risks.
The idea that global catastrophic risks and even existential risks exist has a good
scientific basis [22, 39]. Here is one example where there exists very well-justified
belief: a few billion years from now, the Sun is expected to no longer provide any
good conditions for life on our planet [22]. However, this scenario is of course so
vastly remote that it is practically meaningless to care about today. It has however
been argued that there are also more near-term existential risks that deserve more of
our attention [20, 63, 39]. Existential risk can be attributed to three main sources:
a) nature; b) unintentional human acts; and c) intentional human acts [22].
The first group of natural risks are those believed to be most well understood.
This group includes major asteroid impacts, supernovas and other astronomical
phenomena, supervolcanoes on Earth and severe pandemics [22]. However, these are
also the risks judged the least likely to be realized on short time scales such as the
coming century. From data compiled about time series of such events [39], it seems
that we can expect them to occur hundreds of thousands to millions of years apart.
So what are the more likely existential risks over shorter time spans? The two
other groups of existential risk relate to human actions and are believed to mainly in-
volve our increasing technological capabilities [22, 63, 39]. The idea is that increased
technological powers to control and modify our environment can be used either for
the good or the bad, with some of the dangers being at least catastrophic risks.
A well-understood example of this is nuclear technology enabling the potential for
large-scale nuclear war, a danger which has existed for over 50 years. However, the
idea is also that specific new technologies that can provide great benefits are also
believed to grant tremendous destructive power to smaller groups of individuals:
These include unintended or intended use of synthetic biology (bioerror or bioter-
ror) [22], powerful artificial superintelligence getting out of our control [21] and other
scenarios including destructive use of nanotechnology [39]. All these scenarios come
with many factors of uncertainty regarding particular mechanisms and technologies.
Asking experts and the general public to estimate probabilities for existential
risks gives the following picture. For the surveyed experts from a Global Catas-
trophic Risk conference in 2008, the median of the estimated probabilities for ex-
tinction during the coming century was 19% [65], which suggests that we can not
safely ignore such events during the coming century. For the general public, a more
recent poll by authorities in Sweden surveyed over six thousand 18-year olds in 2015,
and in this group 3% believed extinction would happen during their lifetime [35].
The median estimated probabilities in the expert survey for extinction during the
coming century were weapons technologies (5%), artificial superintelligence going
wrong (5%), wars (including nuclear) (4%), pandemies (2%), and nuclear war (1%).
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In the public survey, among the 56% believing in an extinction at some future point
in time, and when asked about what the cause of extinction would be the most
common answer (31%) was climate change.8 Asking experts and public polls both
have their different problems, and these are not directly scientific studies of existen-
tial risk. However, the results above suggest the following question: Could climate
change be an existential risk?
Climate change: a catastrophic or existential risk?
Climate change is considered a global catastrophic risk because it can have a long-
term global effect on the environment, which means dangers for current and future
generations [22]. Both an increased average temperature and the extreme ends of
the temperature distribution of the weather are important as there can be gradual
or sudden damage to critical ecosystems such as ice sheets and global agricultural
systems, making areas with human settlements unhabitable. The extent and timing
of the damage to be expected for a specific scenario of unmitigated greenhouse gas
emissions is hard to quantify precisely, partially because the uncertainty about the
equilibrium climate sensitivity9 spans over several degrees [47, 62].
Most of the increase in the global average surface temperature during the last
sixty years is “extremely likely” due to human influence [62]. Whether to mitigate
climate change by stabilizing greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere at a sufficiently
low level therefore seems up to us. However, it has been unclear just how severe
the consequences of unmitigated climate change can become. Could climate change
be also an existential risk? The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, adopted by almost all in 1992, forms the basis for international climate
negotiations and involves the term ”dangerous”:
“The ultimate objective of this convention and any related legal instruments that
the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve [...] stabilization of green-
house gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” (italics added)
International climate negotiations have since then specified limiting global warm-
ing below 2 or 1.5 degrees Celsius. However, these negotiations do not explicitly
define what dangerous means or orient that term in relation to “catastrophic” or
“existential”, nor do they help determine whether unmitigated climate change poses
an existential, or merely a catastrophic, risk. Scenarios have been proposed that
could make severe climate change an existential risk, such as the so-called “Venus
syndrome”, discussed as a possibility by Hansen [40], in which changed atmospheric
conditions could set off a runaway effect involving greenhouse gases, temperatures
8Followed by world war (16%), resource scarcity (13%), death of the Sun 9% and pandemic
(6%) and natural disaster (5%)
9Defined as the effect on long-term equilibrium temperature increase from a doubling of CO2
concentration in the atmosphere.
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and boiling up our oceans, but Hansen has later withdrawn from this view [39, 41].
A recent report that surveys existential risks attaches a low probability to the pos-
sibility that the effects of climate change on our natural environment could lead to
outcomes on the level of existential risk [63]. While a scenario of extreme effects
cannot be entirely ruled out because it is believed unlikely, it seems more likely that
if climate change were to trigger events on the magnitude of existential risks, this
would follow secondary effects such as large-scale competition for access to resources
such as freshwater and agricultural land, which could set off a spiral of large-scale
conflicts with severe social consequences [39].
Climate negotiations present a challenge to international cooperation because of
the sheer number of countries involved as well as complicated questions of historical
justice, the moral status of future generations and the collective action problem
among nation-states [10]. The normal way to solve collective action problems within
nation-states is for the state, as an authority, to establish institutions, in order to
prevent free-riding. One example is with the institution of taxation, that ensures
that public goods can be achieved [10]. The absence of an international supranational
authority certainly has its benefits in allowing national sovereignty. However, this
situation makes it more complicated to solve the free-riding problem if the states
pursue their own interests [55].
So far, the observed global warming has been gradual, but the question of critical
climate thresholds, beyond which catastrophic consequences could suddenly appear,
is important as we could possibly learn to detect these tipping points in advance
[53, 67]. The effect of increasing emissions beyond some threshold could be to
push ecosystems above some limit, setting off an irreversible, catastrophic change.
Theories and experiments have been developed to handle such cases involving so-
called early warning signals methods [68, 52]. Another question is how the presence
of a sharp threshold for catastrophic risk affects climate negotiations. Here, both
theory [11] and experiments [12] suggest that a well-known threshold could actually
simplify negotiations aimed at keeping below the threshold to avoid catastrophe.
In paper III, we present and analyze a model of climate negotiations under such
circumstances with a tipping point: Climate change is assumed to pose a catas-
trophic risk above a given emissions threshold. In paper IV, we examine the Great
Filter argument, a framwork which makes it possible to reason about the level of
existential risk in somewhat more general terms.
The Great Filter argument and Existential Risk
Can we reason scientifically about existential risk? While we can reason about
existential risks in theory, there are several methodological difficulties in studying
many of these risks based on observations. By definition, we cannot observe these
events on our planet more than once, as an actual event would mean the end of being
an observer. This opens up the door to speculation and arbitrariness in coming up
with catastrophic scenarios. It could also be unwarranted to believe that we could
produce a final list of existential risks before having observed any existential events.
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The former problem has been addressed as part of the discussion about the decision-
theoretic problem “Pascal’s wager” [39]. The latter problem is acknowledged by
using a category of ”unknown unknowns” [63], but this does not solve the problem.
The Great Filter argument introduced by Hanson [42] and described further by
Bostrom [42], and further quantified by Aldous [19] and Ha¨ggstro¨m [39], can be
viewed as an indirect way of reasoning about generic existential risk. The Great
Filter can also be viewed as a proposed answer to a question asked by Fermi in
the 1950s, which has come to be known as the Fermi Paradox [74]: How can we
explain the absence of scientific observations of extraterrestrial life, so far, in a
vast universe much older than Earth? Assume we believe that emergence of life
on a planet with progress up to intelligent life to the level of present-day human
civilization is very unlikely, but that this happens with a tiny probability p (say, p
to be one in a billion) on a randomly chosen planet. Also assume that, given that
life on this level has emerged on a given planet, there is further a tiny conditional
probability q (for the argument, let q be one in a billion) that this life will progress
to a technical level beyond current human capabilities so that it becomes visible
across the universe because of technological capabilities such as large-scale energy
use and space colonization [2]. To start with, colonizing other planets in the Milky
Way would undoubtedly take a very long time, on the scale of millions of years using
technology which can allow travel at a few percent of the speed of light, and one could
question whether we should be able to see signs of this yet. However, comparing
these millions of years to the time scale of billions of years of the universe, this is
still a short period, and many planets are estimated to be much older than Earth.
A number of other possibilities are available to explain why we should not be able
to see other civilizations with advanced technology [74], but we put these aside for
the moment and consider the effect of these small assumed values of p and q.
Even with p and q one in a billion, chosen just for the argument, and with the
number of planets in the vast visible universe estimated to be around N = 1022
[27], we should expect there to be thousands of civilisations (around Npq) out there.
Basic evolutionary arguments suggest that if there would be thousands, it would be
unlikely to not have seen signs of at least one of them and that not at least one of
them could have attempted colonizing space somewhere earlier in time and become
observable long ago [44, 42]. Yet, we see no signs. This is the Fermi Paradox. The
Great Filter is the hypothesis that there is some kind of filter on the path between
the formation of a lifeless planet in the universe and a super-technological civilization
that filters out all, or almost all, planets along this path. This great silence that
we see suggests that Npq is not large, and if N is very large, then the great silence
suggests that pq has to be very small. This means that either p or q, or both of
them, have to be small.
Hanson has suggested a number of candidates for the Great Filter and the fol-
lowing examples are from his list [42]. First, it could be necessary for a planet to
start out in exactly the same chemical circumstances around the right type of star,
and here we could have been very lucky. Second, it could be extremely unlikely that
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some form of primitive life emerges such as self-replicating molecules (that could
initiate further biological evolution) on a lifeless planet. Currently, how hard this is
seems unknown, and there seem to be no established theories that allow estimating
this probability based on biological first principles about what is required for life to
emerge from a setting like a primordial soup. Third, the Great Filter could relate
to various levels of complexity similar to what life on Earth has passed through: as
far as is known, for billions of years life on Earth went through long periods of little
or no innovation, interrupted by sudden shifts and increase in complexity such as in
the Cambrian explosion [42]. Over long time scales, maybe natural existential risks
have enough time to wipe out almost all forms of life, and that we have been very
lucky. However, we do not know about what mechanisms would strike so often in
such varying circumstances so as to let life survive on almost no planets. Finally, the
Great Filter may also be located somewhere ahead of a civilization on our technical
level. The idea is that somewhere between our current technological capabilities
and a more advanced technological civilization, whose actions become visible over
longer ranges, there are threats from technology and human actions. It is exactly
this that Hanson and Bostrom have argued we could learn more about if we observe
extraterrestrial life [42, 19].
Suppose there is a Great Filter: What would be learned from observing extrater-
restrial life which has not reached a technological super-civilization? Contrary to
common opinion, Hanson and Bostrom have claimed that this observation would be
bad news in terms of q. In Bostrom’s words: “It would be good news if we find Mars
to be completely sterile. Dead rocks and lifeless sands would lift my spirit.” [19]
Bostrom’s argument is roughly this: Since Npq is small, and N large, pq must be
small. An observation of life on another planet is evidence of a higher p which could
then suggest a smaller q, and this would be bad news for the prospects of a typical
civilization on our level to progress on to a super-technological level. More precisely,
Bostrom writes that “The effect would be to shift the probability more strongly to
the hypothesis that the Great Filter is ahead of us, not behind us” (italics added)
[19]. The natural interpretation of this claim is that this would lower the expected
value of q.
In paper IV, we analyze this argument presented by Bostrom and Hanson with
a Bayesian analysis to represent the uncertainty about parameters p and q. We
demonstrate that the effect on the posterior for the expected value of q depends on
assumptions about the prior distribution and provide an example where the expected
value of q does increase. So while the argument holds for many different priors, it
does not hold for all, and in paper IV this is examined for a few different scenarios.
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1.2 Game theory
Papers I, II, III, and V all make use of methods from game theory and learning.
Computational simulation is used to examine properties of the models.
Game theory is the study of strategic interaction between rational agents, intro-
duced in the 1940s by von Neumann and Morgenstern [58]. The interaction between
the agents is described by a game, which requires defining at least three components.
First, a set of two or more players representing the decision-making agents. Second,
the set of pure strategies available to each player, from which a player has to make a
choice, specifying the actions of the player in every possible state of the game. Third,
players’ preferences over the possible outcomes, described by utility functions. The
use of a utility function is to provide a quantitative description of players’ prefer-
ences over the possible outcomes. Assuming that players are rational corresponds
to maximisation using the utility function as will be discussed more below. That a
strategy specifies the actions for a player as a function of every possible state of the
game means that players can take history into account when deciding what to do.
1.2.1 The Prisoners’ Dilemma
A well-known game theoretic model of a strong collective action problem is called the
Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD), with two players that both have two available strategies
[8]. The players make their choices simultaneously, and each player can either choose
to “cooperate” (C) or “defect” (D). This is a model for where the outcome (C,C) is
particularly hard to achieve and the utility function needs to be defined to describe
this.
Figure 1.1(a) shows an example of utilities for a particular PD game. Selecting
one row and one column determines utilities for both players as an ordered tuple for
player 1 and player 2. Player 1 makes a choice of strategy which can be viewed as
choosing one of the rows in the utility matrix. Similarly, player 2 chooses between
columns. We can see that the utilities are ordered so that rational choice makes
players worse off in full defection compared to the case of cooperation.
(a)
Player 1
Player 2
C D
C 3,3 0,5
D 5,0 1,1
(b)
Player 1
Player 2
C D
C R,R S,T
D T,S P,P
Figure 1.1: The single-round Prisoners’ Dilemma. Utilities are a function of the
strategies chosen by the row and the column players, with left utility to the row
player, and right utility to the column player. Panel a) shows a particular instance
of the game. Panel b) shows the general form of the utilities and the parameter
values for Temptation, Reward, Punishment and Sucker ensure the properties of
the game if they follow Equations 1.1 and 1.2.
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Moreover, for each player choosing D is best no matter of what the other player
will do: strategy D is strongly dominant. Thus, no communication or agreements
(unless these change the utilities of the game) could result in cooperation between
players. Figure 1.1(b) illustrates the notation of the utilities (T,R, P, S) for a generic
PD game depending on the players’ choices of strategies. For the game to be a PD,
it is required that
T > R > P > S (1.1)
holds for the utilities. To defect gives the “temptation” utility T for a player that
defects when the opponent10 cooperates. Cooperation gives a player the “reward”
utility R when the other also cooperates. However, when both players defect a
“punishment” utility of P results. Finally, cooperating when the opponent defects
gives a “sucker’s” utility S.
Rational players will thus end up in the trap of full defection. This is also the
only “Pareto inferior” outcome from which both players could improve their utilities
(from (P, P ) to (R,R)) without making another player worse off. The game is
constructed in such a manner that the only outcome which is Pareto inferior is also
the only Nash equilibrium, i.e., the pair of strategies from which it is irrational to
deviate (see Section 1.2.3 below). This is a strong collective action problem and also
shows how individual rationality does not correspond to collective action,11 because
players do not reach any of the other outcomes, of which none is Pareto inferior.
For the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, where the single game is repeated for a
number of rounds, it is also a convention to assume that
2R > T + S (1.2)
which excludes situations where the two players could find ways to take turns to
cooperate and defect. Otherwise, alternating between (C,D) and (D,C) could give
better outcome on the average than (C,C) and this would change the structure of
the collective action problem. The point of the game is that, by assuming players
are rational, we expect the players to be trapped in universal defection.
So is there any room for cooperation at all in the Prisoners’ Dilemma? The only
cause in the single game would be because of irrationality. However, in papers I
and II, we will discuss the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, where the game
is repeated a number of rounds and in each round there is a separate Prisoners’
Dilemma. There are possibilities for both cooperation and defection in this game,
and we return to this in Section 1.2.4 below.
10This is simply a convention to help distinguish the player, whose decisions are considered, from
the other player.
11In the sense of collective action satisfying more of the players’ preferences, not in terms of
adding up utilities. The utility function assumed in game theory is normally assumed to be defined
up to a positive linear tranformation (Section 1.2.2), and so aggregating utilities between the players
would not be relevant here. It would be possible to take utilities for only one of the players in Figure
1.1(a) and multiply them by, say, 1, 000. This would represent the same preferences, but make the
sum of utilities greater for one of the outcomes involving one player choosing C and one choosing
D, unlike the base case.
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1.2.2 Rationality
At this point, the reader might be wondering what is so “rational” after all about
both players defecting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma. If it makes players worse off,
perhaps it is not so rational? We now turn to discuss some of the conditions and
theory about expected utility maximization which has been termed rational [37, 17].
Rationality in game theory is usually taken to be maximizing expected utility.
This is well-defined as long as there is both a utility function and a probability
distribution which describes beliefs. But why would expected utility maxmization
be rational and not some other decision rule? There are two well-established theories
for this that attempt to provide an underlying logic and justification for this decision
rule.
First, the theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern [58] shows conditions under
which the utility function exist. In game-theoretic models, the starting point is
usually to assume the existence of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for
each player [34].
Second, the theory by Savage [66] can be used to motivate subjective beliefs and
Bayesian learning. Primary to both theories is the technical notion of a preference
relation <, which is a binary ranking of how a decision-maker ranks pair-wise choices
from a set A. To write a1 < a2 can be interpreted “a1 is weakly preferred to a2”
when the decision-maker is presented with two options a1 and a2 from a set of
available choices A.
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
The decision-theoretic model presented by von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM)
has a decision-maker choosing among a set of “lotteries”. Each element ai in A is
a lottery with known probabilities pi,1, ..., pi,m for m distinct outcomes in the set of
consequences C = (c1, ..., cm). The outcomes are not necessarily monetary, as may
come to mind for normal lotteries, but completely general, so that consequences can
have elements that are very qualitatively different such as “apple”, “death”, and
“+$100”.
Write ∆C for all possible probability distributions over the m. The problem for
the decision-maker is to choose among the available options A ⊆ ∆C to satisfy the
preference described by <. The axioms in the vNM theory makes restrictions on
how the decision-maker has preferences < between all pairwise choices in the full set
∆C.
So far the preference relation < is qualitative in that it is used to make pair-
wise choices between any pairs ai and aj in A with corresponding probabilities
pi,1, ..., pi,m and pj,1, ..., pj,m. But under what circumstances does there exist a
utility function u to quantitatively rank the preferences so that ai < aj if and only
if
∑
u(ck)pi,k ≥
∑
u(ck)pj,k, for each ai and aj? This is expected utility where
utilities of outcomes are weighted by the probabilities.
Here is where the vNM result provides an axiomatic justification, if the decision-
maker has preferences < among all the lotteries in ∆C satisfying four axioms: Com-
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pleteness, Transitivity, Continuity and Independence. Then, such a utility function
u does exist and it is unique up to a positive linear transformation [58].
The following is a discussion to illustrate what these four axioms demand for a
preference relation <, and we use examples to illustrate what it can demand from a
decision-maker. The axioms have been discussed before many times [51, 36], so the
following is meant to present what is alrady well-known facts and discussions about
the theory, for the purpose of being able to judge under what conditions to expect
utility maximization to hold. Here are the axioms:
Completeness: For each P,Q ∈ ∆C: P < Q or Q < P .
This means that all different choices should be comparable to each other, and it
seems to be the most straightforward axiom. It demands that the decision-maker
should have well-defined preferences and always have well-defined preferences, even
among outcomes that could appear to be qualitatively very different. It should not
be hard to “compare apples and oranges”, at least up to the level of indifference.12
Transitivity: For each P,Q,R ∈ ∆C: if P < Q and Q < R then P < R.
Transitive preferences rule out decision-makers being caught in cycles. Example:
a cyclical preference could be as follows where C = {apple, banana, lemon} corre-
sponding to the outcomes to get a certain fruit. Consider the choice between the
three different possible certain choices (certain lotteries) that are all elements from
∆C in the following example which violates the axiom.
Suppose the decision-maker expresses the three preferences as apple < banana,
banana < lemon and lemon < apple. This could get into a cycle where for any item
there could always be something better to satisfy. Why would this be a problem?
In concrete monetary terms, a decision-maker having this structure of preferences
acting on a market could end up being used as a “money pump”. By handing the
decision-maker any given fruit, there could exist an interest in paying a small price
to get the preferred option (unless there is full indifference between the choices).
But given the preferred option, there is now again another better outcome, again for
a small price, and so on. Cyclical preferences can for a number of reasons be judged
as irrational because they might never lead to an actual preferred outcome.
For the next axiom, we write P  Q for the strict preference of P over Q, which
means Q 6< P and P < Q. Also write pY +(1−p)Z for a lottery which gives Y ∈ ∆C
with probability p and Z ∈ ∆C with probability 1− p.
Continuity: For all P,Q,R ∈ ∆C, if P  Q  R there always exists α, β ∈ (0, 1)
so that αP + (1− α)R  Q  βP + (1− β)R.
12Indifference between lotteries ai and aj means that both ai < aj and aj < ai hold.
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This axiom demands that qualitatively different options can be compared to each
other and that the decision-maker is always willing to risk the worst outcome if the
probability is just small enough.
Example from Gilboa [36]: consider where C = {+$1, $0, death} and where the
decision-maker expresses death  +$1  $0. Here the axiom demands that there
exists a probability α sufficiently high but below 1 so that with P ′ = +$1, Q′ =
$0, R′ = death the agent will have preferences over ∆C that for high α < 1: αP ′ +
(1− α)R′  Q′.
This means the axioms demands there is some lottery where the decision-maker
actually prefers to gamble between +$1 and death instead of getting a zero monetary
outcome, if death is just very unlikely. A possible response is that this is nonsense,
but consider a person having to decide between buying a $1 newspaper and pass-
ing a street (with occasional cars) to get a free one. Here, the option to cross the
street could represent the lottery between a small gain, with almost certainty, and
with a miniscule risk of fatal car accident. Using such examples, it has been argued
that real people actually choose such lotteries over certainty in everyday situations
and that we take such very small fatal risks might not so easily be ruled out after all.
Independence: For every α ∈ (0, 1) and P,Q,R ∈ ∆C,
P < Q if and only if αP + (1− α)R < αQ+ (1− α)R.
The independence axiom means that if a lottery P is preferred to Q, then this
preference will continue if we add the same possibility with the same probability to
both lotteries. It also says that if two lotteries αP + (1 − α)R and αQ + (1 − α)R
are compared then the decision-maker can resolve this preference by comparing only
where they differ, between P and Q, and this should hold independently for all α
and R.
Example: many experimental results have been found where the independence
axiom seems to be systematically violated by people. One example is from Tversky
and Kahneman [48] who experimentally examined individual preferences by present-
ing people with two different problems. Their problems were presented like this:
Problem 1
Choose between the two lotteries:
• Lottery A: $2, 500 with probability 0.33, $2, 400 with probability 0.66, and $0
with probability 0.01
• Lottery B: $2, 400 with probability 1 (certainty)
Problem 2
Choose between the two lotteries:
• Lottery C: $2, 500 with probability 0.33, $0 with probability 0.67
• Lottery D: $2, 400 with probability 0.34, $0 with probability 0.66
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What the experiments showed was that people often prefer B over A but C over
D, which violates the axiom. Note that problem 2 can be turned into problem 1
by adding the outcome $2, 400 with probability 0.66. If there would exist a utility
function u describing this preference, we could normalize it by linear transformation
to u($0) = 0 and from B < A get that:
u($2, 400) ≥ 0.33u($2, 500) + 0.66u($2, 400) + 0.01u($0)
↔
0.34u($2, 400) ≥ 0.33u($2, 500)
But the preference C < D contradicts this with 0.33u(2, 500) ≥ 0.34u(2, 400) show-
ing what can happen if violating the independence assumption [48]. Tversky and
Kahneman suggest this is can be explained as a certainty effect: people overweight
outcomes that are certain compared to these being merely very probable. A number
of models have been suggested to explain such systematic violations of, among other
things, the independence axiom [48, 73].
The Savage framework and Bayesian rationality
The theory which has also come to be known as “Bayesian rationality” [17] was
introduced by Savage [66] with results similar to the theory of vNM, but under
more general conditions. The main conceptual difference is that the preferences are
defined over choices where there are no objectively given probabilities and thus no
quantified information at all, as in the vNM theory.
The situation is more general involving only qualitatively described “acts”, “states”
and “consequences”. An act maps possible states into consequences. In this general
condition, the result from Savage’s theory is to present axioms [66], if satisfied for
preferences between the acts, that ensure the decision-maker has preferences as if
holding a “subjective” probability distribution as well as a utility function. The
two then rank preferences in expected utility like described above. Now utilities are
instead weighted by the subjective probability distribution.
These additional axioms have also been thoroughly discussed and questioned
[36, 17], but what is interesting for this thesis is that Savage’s result is consistent
with learning using Bayes’ rule when the decision-maker makes observations [49,
17]. Thus, this theory of choice under uncertainty has also been used to suggest a
particular learning rule to update beliefs given observations. Paper II and IV makes
use of models based on a Bayesian analyis.
1.2.3 Solution concepts and Nash equilibrium
A central question in game theory is how one can predict what strategies in a game
get chosen by rational players. In order to do this, game theory has different solution
concepts that describe which strategies will be chosen by the players. Two of the
standard solution concepts, Nash equilibrium and backward induction arguments,
will be presented below. In the following examples we illustrate the solution concepts
with the Prisoners’ Dilemma, without trying to generalize as much as possible.
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Nash Equilibrium
When there are two players, a Nash equilibrium (NE) [57] (s, t) is a pair of strategies
such that these strategies are best-response to each other. This means that strategy
s is rational against t and t rational against s. No player has any incentive to change
in terms of increasing utility, so this is thought of as an equilibrium. With the two
players being described by utility functions u1 and u2, a pair of strategies (s, t) is
a NE when both u1(s, t) ≥ u1(s′, t) and u2(t, s) ≥ u2(t′, s) for all s′ and t′, where
s and s′ are taken from strategy set of player 1, and t as well as t′ are taken from
strategy set of player 2.
In more general circumstances, each strategy in the NE is a best-response to
the others, and each finite game has at least one NE [57]. The NE in the general
case possibly involves players randomizing among strategies, but in the Prisoners’
Dilemma, the only NE is both players defecting. This can be seen in Figure 1.1(a),
which shows the utility function of a particular Prisoners’ Dilemma game as a matrix.
The unique NE here is (D,D), since in other cases at least one rational player could
change strategy to increase utility.
1.2.4 The Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
We have seen that defection is the only outcome for rational players in the single
round Prisoners’ Dilemma. In this section, a simple example is used to illustrate
why rationality itself does not mean full defection in the FRPD, where the game
is repeated in a finite and known number of N > 1 rounds. In the PD, rationality
independent of belief leads to defection. In the FRPD, predictions about rational
players depend on their belief about the opponent in future rounds.
The main difference compared to the one-round game is that repetition allows
a player to choose a strategy that reacts to history in previous rounds. This, in
turn, makes it relevant for players to consider the effect of their actions on later
rounds. As we saw in Section 1.2.2, rational choice in general is determined both
by rationality and belief, so that cooperation is possible for rational players if they
have a belief that determines cooperation to maximize expected utility.
The role of belief can be illustrated with a simple example of the two-round
FRPD. Assume first a player believes with certainty that the opponent will defect in
both rounds, no matter the action played out in the first round. In this case, rational
choice is to defect in both of the rounds since the maximum possible utility is 2P .
But suppose that a player believes the opponent will cooperate in the first round,
and choose a follow-up action in the second to mirror the other player’s action in
the first round. This strategy is known as “tit-for-tat” [8]. Defecting from the first
round would lead to an expected utility of T + P , whereas cooperation in the first
round followed by defection would lead to expected utility of R + T . Now, given
the belief we have assumed about the opponent playing tit-for-tat, and following the
restrictions on the utilities in PD, it is rational for the player to start by cooperation
and then defect in the second round.
This simple example shows that a player’s belief can have a crucial role in de-
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termining rational choice in the FRPD. Thus, some assumptions on players’ beliefs
have to be made to unambigously predict the outcome among rational players. It is
here that backward induction comes into play: it is motivated by assuming specific
beliefs about players and their rationality, but it also seem like it brings players back
to the case of full defection in the FRPD.
Backward induction
Backward induction (BI) arguments are often used as solution concepts for repeated
games. In finitely repeated games, such as the FRPD, in which the number of
rounds is known, the solution of how players choose actions can be guided by the
BI procedure as follows [64, 38]. A player can start with considering the last round,
in which utility is maximized by defecting. With both players being rational in the
sense that they want to maximize utility, the outcome of the last round is clear –
mutual defection. But then the next-to-last round turns into the last unresolved
round, and the same reasoning applies again resulting in mutual defection also for
round N − 1. The assumption needed is that each player knows that the other one
is rational. The procedure then repeats all the way to the first round, reaching the
Nash equilibrium with mutual defection from the start of the game [64, 38].
The procedure just described makes a number of assumptions about players’
beliefs and their rationality. Under what form of beliefs is it reasonable to assume
the BI outcome and can players change from BI play? This is where the basis for
BI has been questioned.
1.3 The Backward Induction Problem
While BI predicts full defection in the FRPD, a number of arguments have been
raised against using it as a model assumption.
First, it has been found that this prediction is very different compared to what
is observed in real-world experiments. These results show that people can cooperate
for many rounds in FRPD-like experiments [1] and often start defecting in the final
rounds before the end of the game.
Second, the prediction from BI does not match intuition which underlies part of
what has been discussed in terms of the ”Backward Induction Paradox” [64]. This
is not a paradox in a logical sense involving contradictions, but the term reflects
that the prediction from BI runs against common intuition. Common intuition says,
roughly speaking, that it could very well be rational for a player to cooperate in
the first round: Hoping that the other player decides to switch to cooperation for a
number of rounds, so that they both fare better than with continued defection [64].
This could perhaps explain the experimental results above.
Against these two criticism, it could be argued that the aim of game theoretic
analysis is to make predictions based on assuming rational players and well-justified
belief, not necessarily to describe outcomes in the real world. So is there some other
critique against the model assumptions?
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Third, we have such a critique that Binmore calls the “Backward Induction
Problem” [18]. To understand what Binmore means with this, it is possible to start
by asking: What would players who have belief about BI for the rest of the game
learn if they observed cooperation (or more generally, action which does not follow
from BI13) in the first round of the game? Two approaches seem possible here:
either they change beliefs, those that lead to continued BI, or they do not. And if
they could change their beliefs, should a rational player take this into account when
choosing whether to cooperate or not?
In the first case, observing cooperation can change the belief about the extent
of BI used in the game. We saw in Section 1.2.4 that there are some beliefs that
make it rational to cooperate for some rounds, so other beliefs could also change
the extent of actual BI being used. This seems to open up for some arbitrariness of
choice in that many other beliefs are possible for the player who believed in BI, but
got surprised by cooperation. Suppose that the player now switches to cooperation
in a number of rounds: It seems like it would be rational to consider cooperating
with this player but only up to the next-to-last round of the rounds where the other
player. An argument like this could make cooperation unravel again, and in papers
I and II we examine some of the conditions where this happens and not. This is
done by modeling strategies representing different reactions to cooperation in the
first step of the FRPD.
In the second case, a player with certainty about continued BI would expect
future play to always continue with defection throughout the game. If players have
a certainty in this belief, the belief is self-preserving and the game will continue with
defection. There will be no basis for a player to consider a future effect on play
leading to something else than continued defection. Using model assumptions where
players will believe that beliefs about BI are maintained with certainty throughout
the game is what Binmore calls the ”Backward Induction Problem” [18]. Binmore
refers to a set of beliefs called “Common Knowledge of Rationality” (CKR). CKR
describes players who believe that others are rational, and that others believe they
are rational, and so on with higher-order beliefs making it common knowledge [4].
The effects of using CKR to justify BI in the first place is what Binmore questions
with the Backward Induction Problem. Aumann has shown that CKR implies BI in
games of finite information of perfect information [4]. CKR assumptions also lead
to BI and full defection in the FRPD [38, 7].
In a sequence of papers [15, 16, 18], Binmore has argued that players should be
able to consider play which deviates from what BI predicts, reaching states which
Aumann’s CKR assumptions imply never happens, and that this would falsify the
CKR beliefs, possibly resulting in future actions incompatible with BI. To this,
Aumann maintains [6, 5] that CKR implies that players never leave the prediction
13More generally, Binmore’s critique considers the possibility for out of equilibrium action, and
has raised this question for a number of different games. Here we restrict ourselves to the game
of Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, but Binmore’s critique applies to many repeated games
and much of the discussion has been around the Centipede, Chain-Store games, etc.
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from BI and that this is not an issue with his argument.
Binmore introduces the distinction between knowledge ”as belief” and knowledge
”as commitment” to explain this difference [18]. This distinction shows the difference
between making a model choice where all of a player’s beliefs are open to revision and
where there are certain forms of beliefs that are always fixed. The question seems to
become a philosophical question about whether model assumption are appropriate
that prevent players from considering the revision of some beliefs in the model. With
Elster’s terminology from Section 1.1.2, it appears that Binmore criticises modeling
players with the belief attitude of certainty.
Paper I and paper II do not directly contribute to these arguments, but the
model assumptions in the paper are compatible with the first case above where
some strategies use out-of-equilibrium play in the first round and players can change
to cooperation. Following this are possibilities to cooperate for a number of rounds.
Thus, we do not assume any CKR beliefs for players. We model the problem of how
when different reactions are possible by a population of different strategies. First,
in paper I, by choosing a population model from evolutionary game theory where
there are no players with explicit beliefs. Second, in paper II, there is a population
model of Bayesian players that learn about the strategies that react differently in
the population.
1.4 Population models and learning
In four of the papers (I, II, III and V) the research questions are related to whether
different forms of equilibria is the natural result of one or more mechanisms. In
papers I and II, the question is whether the Nash equilibrium predicted by BI is
reached when we allow different reactions and degrees of BI. Therefore, the approach
can not only be to start in an equilibrium, but to examine whether equilibrium results
from other starting conditions. In papers III and V the equilibria are stable climate
negotiation agreements and price levels, respectively.
The approach to avoid starting in equilibrium when making assumptions about
the initial conditions of the individuals is typical to that of complexity economics [3].
The idea here is to not start with a perfectly ordered system, but a complex system
of heterogenous actions, predictions and strategies and see whether equilibrium is
an outcome from interactions between the individuals. This is in line with complex
systems studies on whether the interaction between many individual elements results
in interesting aggregate patterns. By allowing many different starting points, the
model describes a wider range of states which the system can be in. This allows
to study if and how different ways are possible through which a system reaches the
outcome of interest.
Paper I uses a population model based on evolutionary game theory, where the
basic idea is biologically inspired: Strategies do not represent the decisions by a
rational player, but the outcome of adaptive success involving modifications of ge-
netic representations of strategies. If a strategy performs poorly in terms of utilities
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when interacting with others in a population, a selective mechanism filters out this
strategy over time at the advantage of others.
Paper II, III and V contain population models with explicit agents that can
be heterogeneous in their traits but where learning drives the change of strategy.
Similar to above, the papers study the outcome in a population of agents where
everyone can interact with everyone.
1.4.1 Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory is a field that developed from combining ideas about
game theory and biology and can be traced back to work by Maynard Smith and
Price in the 1970’s applying game theory to reason about animal behavior [54].
The approach is, roughly speaking, to have some form of evolutionary selection
pressure to pick out strategies based on whether they perform well or not in a
population. In evolutionary game theory, it is common to put the emphasis on the
rationality of a player aside and to think of each player in a large population as
having a fixed strategy. In the population of strategies, each strategy has a fitness,
depending on the utility of the strategy in an underlying game when considered
against the other strategies in the population, and the fitness influences the change
in population composition over time. Instead of directly using a solution concept
such as Nash equilibrium or backward induction to predict the outcome as in game
theory, evolutionary game theory studies properties of some population dynamic for
the selection among strategies in order to predict what strategies are played as an
outcome by interaction within the population. It is possible to think of the dynamic
as describing different behaviors in a society, the evolution in an animal population,
or more generally in any multi-agent system where the outcome from the behaviour
of one individual depends on the behaviour of others. A typical question can then
be to consider what different outcomes form an evolutionarily stable strategy, which
is a strategy that, if it is predominant in the population, cannot be invaded and
overtaken by other strategies [54].
Two relevant properties are the size of the population (finite or continuum mod-
els) and different forms of interaction between the strategies (this could be at random
or something else). A finite population has a smallest given unit of a strategy whereas
the continuum models can have an infinitesimal fraction of a strategy remain in the
population (it then makes sense to think about an infinite population).
The replicator dynamic is one of the simplest population dynamics which has
received a lot of attention [71]. The replicator dynamic assumes that the growth rate
of a specific strategy is proportional to how well that strategy performs with respect
to average utility compared in the rest of the population. Each Nash equilibrium is
a steady state in this dynamic (there are no incentives to change), and each steady
state is a Nash equilibrium (otherwise, there would be a drive to change) [33].
An extension that adds a mutation rate  ∈ [0, 1] leads to the replicator-mutation
dynamic [45], where the rate of change for xi, representing the fraction of strategy
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i, in a population is
dxi
dt
= xi (si − s− ) + /n
where  is a uniform mutation rate among the n different strategies, si describes the
average fitness of strategy i in the population, and s describes the average overall
fitness in the population.
In paper I, we use the replicator-mutation dynamic to model evolution of strate-
gies in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma motivated by the Backward In-
duction Problem (see Section 1.3).
1.4.2 Models of learning
Many prescriptive and descriptive models of learning have been suggested in game
theory, decision theory, artificial intelligence and economics [33]. A model with a
learning agent often has at least three components: a model which describes how the
agent makes observations, the parameters which describe the beliefs, and learning
rules that update the parameters based on the observations. The model coupled
with the parameters is what the agent can use to, e.g., make predictions. A learning
rule often forms part of the modeling and analysis and this can be found in papers
II, III, IV and V.
Bayesian learning
A theory of Bayesian rationality exists as described in Section 1.2.2, which suggests
learning based on Bayesian updating [49]. Using Bayes’ rule to let a player update
belief, from a prior distribution to a posterior, requires a few different things.
To make Bayesian learning well-defined, two things have be specified. First, a
prior distribution. This choice can have some arbitrariness to it, but it can sometimes
be argued that the effect of choosing a prior becomes less relevant over time as more
observations become available. Second, a model has to be chosen for the likelihood
of observations, given the uncertain states of the world. This choice should also be
justified and it may not be obvious what the correct model which relates observations
to the possible states of the world.
In this thesis, we will use Bayes formula to present a learning rule for repeated
learning among players in a population (paper II) and the effect of observations
on in a Bayesian analysis (paper IV). In paper II, we will model a player as having
uncertainty about the probability to find different strategies in the population within
which it interacts to play the FRPD. The aim of this is to study cooperation as an
effect of learning when a player interacts with opponents from a population. In
paper IV, we study the effect on learning and vary the prior to model and examine
Hanson’s and Bostrom’s Great Filter arguments (Section 1.1.3).
Fictitious play
With fictitious play, players respond to the historical frequency of play by other
players. One particular form of fictitious play is that players predict the actions of
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others simply as the historical average of their actions.
If players assume they are learning about a stationary environment and do not
take into account other players that similarly learn and change in parallell, there is
also a Bayesian justification for this in terms of updating from a prior to a posterior.
One example of this is using a Dirichlet distribution as a prior together with a
multinomial likelihood. The effect of observations in this case is that the probability
that next observation will be si is simply the historical frequency of observation
si plus the effect of some initial parameter [33]. The effect of the choice of initial
parameters is then gradually diminishing.
In paper II we use a learning rule which is also comparable to fictitious play,
based on this Bayesian model. However, we assume that players do not believe they
are in a stationary environment and we add a term to discount previous observations.
In paper III, one of the learning rules we analyze is a form of fictitious play but here
the strategy set is continous for bids of emission levels, where players predict the
strategy of others based on their historical bids. This is a learning rule previously
used in climate negotiation models [69].
1.4.3 Level-k, strategic reasoning and learning
Level-k models [29] are used to model strategic reasoning in how players anticipate
the actions of other players. Level-k models specify players on different levels of
strategic reasoning. An important model component is the specification of the level-
0 player, which is usually level-1 players’ naive model of others. Then, players at
level-2 can predict others as level-1 and use this belief as a basis for best response.
Including higher levels of k can be done in different ways [29].
The level-0 specification can also represent a learning rule which “naively” pre-
dicts other players’ strategies based on historical observations. This can be on forms
such as simple averagring based on history. In paper III, we use a level-k approach
to model strategic reasoning in a model of climate negotiations, where it can be use-
ful to use strategic reasoning. We use the level-k approach to examine the effect of
adding strategic reasoning compared to previous work which used a particular level-
0 learning rule (paper III, Supplementary Information). We consider other level-0
learning rules that describe discounting of older observations.
Partial best-response dynamic
This is a form of learning which can also be viewed as a form of adaptation, as in
each time step of a repeated interaction a fixed part of the population switches from
its current action to a best response to the aggregate statistic from the previous
period [33].
In paper V, where agents make a predicition of prices in order to maximize their
profits, we also have that only a fraction of the producers can change their production
decisions in each time step. Thus, our learning rule in paper V can be viewed as a
partial best-response dynamic.
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Rational expectations
A particular form of belief which has been suggested for models of price movements in
markets is known as rational expectations [56]. This represents an idea that agents
can perfectly predict the coming prices based on economic theory of equilibrium.
Thus, a population of agents with only rational expectations directly end up in
equilibrium since the assumed belief justifies playing equilibrium.
The concept of rational expectations is used in economic theory, but the termi-
nology does not make it easier to distinguish rationality from belief. In paper V, we
consider the possibility that agents can have beliefs by a form rational expectations
that has perfect information about next year’s prices.
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1.5 Paper I
Motivated by the backward induction problem, we model different reactions to co-
operation in the first round of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma. The dif-
ferent reactions for different extent of backward induction are described by different
strategies in the strategy set. We make sure that the strategy set always contains a
strategy which can defect the round before a cooperative strategy starts to defect.
This is made in order to avoid introducing artificial cooperation through cooperative
Nash equilibria.
We investigate if the Nash equilibrium solution for two different sets of strategies
is reached in an evolutionary context with replicator-mutation dynamics.
The first set consists of conditional cooperators, up to a certain round, while
the second set in addition to these contains two strategy types that react differently
on the first round action: The ”Convincer” strategies insist with two rounds of
initial cooperation, trying to establish more cooperative play in the game, while the
”Follower” strategies, although being first round defectors, have the capability to
respond to an invite in the first round.
The research questions in this paper include:
1. What is the evolutionary outcome with the strategy sets of conditional coop-
erators, Convincers and Followers?
2. How does the choice of strategy set (the conditional cooperators versus the full
strategy set) affect the results?
3. What conditions affect stable cooperation and defection levels in the evolu-
tionary outcomes?
4. What is the effect of mutations?
The findings include that:
1. We show for the conditional cooperators that, as the mutation rate becomes
sufficiently small, the cyclic behaviour disappears and the system is attracted
to a stable fixed point.
2. The extended strategy set, including Convincers and Followers, allows for cy-
cles in which cooperative players return after a period of defection.
3. For some regions in the parameter space, the evolutionary dynamics does not
reach a stable fixed point, but stays in an oscillatory mode.
4. Taken together, this illustrates that the Nash equilibrium play can be unstable
at the population level when mutations make explorations off the equilibrium
path possible.
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1.6 Paper II
In this paper, we follow up on the ideas established by paper I. From the discussion
about the backward induction problem we saw that a critique against backward
induction as a model assumption rules out belief revision about the extent of back-
ward induction taking place. We model Bayesian players that consider strategies in
the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (FRPD) that describe different lengths
of applying backward induction. For players the decision between initial defection
and cooperation is a strategic choice over the same strategy set as for paper I, but
this model considers a finite population with learning players.
The research questions in this paper include:
1. How can we model a player’s learning about the strategies in the population
using a Bayesian approach?
2. How does the choice of strategy set (only the conditional cooperators versus
the full strategy set, with Convincers and Followers) affect the results?
3. Are there some conditions with outcomes of recurrent cooperation in the pop-
ulation?
4. What is the effect of a small rate of -optimization on cooperation in the
population?
The findings include that:
1. One way to model players’ beliefs and learning is by a Dirichlet prior and
multinomial likelihood of the observed strategies.
2. For both strategy sets, cooperation in the population can be eliminated from
backwards as an effect of Bayesian learning, and it can lead to an equilibrium
state of full defection.
3. The population can go through recurrent periods of cooperation for sufficiently
long FRPD games if there is an arbitrarily small level of -optimization, mean-
ing that players are indifferent between strategies within distance  > 0 of the
optimal strategy in terms of expected utility maximization.
4. In our model, whether cooperation is fully eliminated from the population is
highly sensitive to the rationality assumption of expected utility maximization.
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1.7 Paper III
Two decades of international negotiations show that agreeing on emission levels
for climate change mitigation is a hard challenge. However, if early warning sig-
nals would show an upcoming tipping point with catastrophic damage, theory and
experiments suggested this could simplify the collective action problem to avoid
catastrophe. At the actual threshold, no country would have a free-ride incentive to
increase emissions over the tipping point, but it remains for countries to negotiate
their emission levels to reach these agreements. We model agents bargaining for
emission levels using strategic reasoning to predict emission bids by others and ask
how this affects the possibility of reaching agreements that avoid catastrophic dam-
age. It is known that policy elites often use a higher degree of strategic reasoning
and in our model this increases the risk for climate catastrophe. Moreover, some
forms of higher strategic reasoning make agreements to reduce greenhouse gases un-
stable. We use empirically informed levels of strategic reasoning when simulating
the model.
The research questions in this paper include:
1. How can we extend the previous work in the literature to incorporate and
model strategic reasoning?
2. What effects do higher levels of strategic reasoning have on the possibility for
agents in the model to agree and avoid climate catastrophe?
3. Does the effect also hold for different level-0 learning specifications?
4. What is the effect of restricting the range of bids for the initial demands on
greenhouse gas emissions?
The findings include that:
1. To model strategic reasoning in players, we use a level-k model of players,
where heterogeneous levels can represent different players on different levels of
strategic reasoning.
2. In our model the inclusion of higher levels of reasoning typically increases the
risk for climate catastrophe. Some forms of higher strategic reasoning make
agreements to reduce greenhouse gases unstable.
3. The effect also holds for a range of parameters in a different family of level-0
specifications, called exponential smoothing.
4. The measure of restricting bids in the initial round also has some effect on
increasing the possibilities of agreement even when including higher levels of
strategic reasoning.
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1.8 Paper IV
The Great Filter interpretation of Fermi’s great silence asserts that Npq is not a very
large number, where N is the number of potentially life-supporting planets in the
observable universe, p is the probability that a randomly chosen such planet develops
intelligent life to the level of present-day human civilization, and q is the conditional
probability that it then goes on to develop a technological supercivilization visible all
over the observable universe. Evidence suggests that N is huge, which implies that
pq is very small. Hanson (1998) and Bostrom (2008) have argued that the discovery
of extraterrestrial life would point towards p not being small and therefore a very
small q.
The research questions in this paper include:
1. How can we quantitatively model Hanson’s and Bostrom’s arguments and in-
clude the observation of extraterrestrial life?
2. What is the effect on the expected value of q in the posterior distribution by
Bayesian updating for a few different priors?
3. Is there some counter-example so that the effect on q contradicts the claims in
the previous arguments?
4. What would be the effect of such a counter-example?
The findings include that:
1. Using a Bayesian analysis, we model this as making observations about (1)
the great silence from a vast number of planets, and (2) one observation of
extraterrestrial life. This is done by modeling the effect of N independent
Bernoulli trials and then one additional observation.
2. In our Bayesian analysis, our first two priors (independent uniform, and inde-
pendent log-uniform) support the previous arguments and give qualitatively
similar results. The third one (perfectly correlated log-uniform), however, con-
tradicts it.
3. The example of a prior perfectly correlated on the diagonal contradicts it, and
we show that there are priors which are also dense in the parameter space.
4. Taken together, this shows that the effect of one observation on q depends
critically on the choice of prior distribution.
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1.9 Paper V
We consider land-use competition between food and bioenergy crops when there is
limited availability of land. Food price fluctuations have been an issue for centuries
and there is need to understand agricultural price dynamics and reason about how
mechanisms can contribute to how the prices vary over time. A particular model to
address the lag between production and realization is the cobweb model, going back
to work in the 1930s.
With an increased demand on biofuels, we can expect the increased demand for
bioenergy crops on certain forms of land. An important question is how volatility can
be reduced or controlled, and what effect the introduction of demand for bioenergy
crops has on the volatility and stability of prices in the system.
The research questions in this paper include:
1. How can we model agents that predict future prices for crops on interacting
cobweb markets?
2. What is the effect of having different mixes of predictors on the price volatility?
3. What is the effect of allowing the agents to switch predictors?
4. What are some mechanisms that can reduce price volatility?
The findings include that:
1. We present a model where the agents have heterogeneous production capaci-
ties, representing variation in global land quality. The markets are interlinked
on the supply side by the limited availability of land.
2. When a sufficient amount of actors with perfect information about next year’s
prices (“rational” expectations) are introduced to our model the steady state
is reached.
3. We find that a more sophisticated (but costly) predictor is concentrated to
some key parcels of land, which enables the system to reduce instability sig-
nificantly. We also find that the adaptive dynamics can cause booms and bust
cycles.
4. In our model, the system can also be brought closer to a stable state by in-
troducing costs for changing production type, but it may then be shifted away
from the optimum situation predicted by the corresponding equilibrium model.
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1.10 Future work
Some of the ideas in this thesis could be extended in several directions.
Paper I raises the question if it could be possible to analytically show that co-
operation becomes recurrent for certain parameters of the model for the extended
strategy space.
Paper II raises the question what would be the effect of vague observations.
Currently, players make perfect observations, i.e., they observe strategies and not
actions. A particular sequence of actions may be compatible with several different
strategies and this could introduce ambiguity regarding which strategy is observed.
It could be possible to let the players use more sophisticated learning rules and
examine if players could learn that they are observing learning cyles [33].
Paper III raises the question what other mechanisms that can be relevant from
behavioural sciences. Currently the players are myopic in their optimization, but
what might be more relevant is looking further to the end result of the negotiations.
There seems to be evidence in the behavioral economics literature that more sophis-
ticated negotiation strategies can have an advantage in real negotiations. This could
suggest new directions of this work. Other learning mechanisms than fictitious play
could also be examined in this framework.
Paper IV raises the question if other consequences could be included to model
the judgments from observing extraterrestrial life. It could be possible to apply this
type of analysis in a more detailed framework with more factors if we have more
knowledge about priors, and perhaps into more philosophical directions.
Paper V raises the question what would happen with different learning rules.
One natural thing would be to examine this work with strategic reasoning. Another
interesting aspect may be to infer structure and parameters of learning rules starting
from real population data.
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